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1. Introduction 
 
In many situations individuals take decisions with clear estimates of the probabilities 
associated with specific outcomes. In other situations people don’t know the probabilistic 
structure of the events. Economists refer to the first situation as risk, and the second as 
ambiguity.
1 These attitudes towards risk and ambiguity are prime candidates to explain 
behavior in financial markets. For instance, since financial assets’ returns tend to be risky and 
(at least at times) ambiguous, aversion to risk and to ambiguity can explain why people are 
reluctant to invest in stocks and therefore demand an equity premium (Epstein and Schneider, 
2010). 
In this paper we undertake a systematic study of risk and ambiguity aversion, how they 
correlate with observable characteristics and how they correlate with each other. To make the 
two concepts operational, we use measures of attitudes towards risk and ambiguity from a 
sample of retail investors as well as from experimental evidence. We complement an 
experimental study with survey data drawn from a representative sample of Unicredit retail 
investors (the Unicredit Client Survey, or UCS).
2 The survey contains detailed demographic 
and financial information as well as a section devoted explicitly to obtaining measures of 
attitudes towards risk and ambiguity. We find that individuals are heterogeneous along both 
dimensions and that attitudes towards risk and ambiguity exhibit a common pattern: those who 
dislike financial risk are also more likely to dislike ambiguity. 
Most interestingly, we show that the attitudes toward risk and ambiguity can be traced 
back to the way individuals approach decisions. Research in psychology suggests that people 
rely on two modes of thinking when making decisions.
3 In the terminology of Stanovich and 
West (2000), the first mode of decision making (System 1) is intuitive thinking, while the 
second mode (System 2) is based on effortful reasoning and systematic processing of 
information. System 2 is calculative, analytical and controlled and involves systematic 
                                                 
1 Ellsberg (1961) was the first to show that individuals tend to prefer prospects whose probabilities are known 
over the same prospects with unknown probabilities. 
2 For details about the survey see also Alvarez, Guiso and Lippi (2011). 
3 See Sloman (1996), Evans and Over (1996), Hammond (1996), Stanovich and West (2000), Gilovich et al. 
(2002), Kahneman (2003) and Slovic (2003).   8
conscious comparisons of different alternatives. While such deliberative reasoning is slow, 
System 1 is quick, automatic and can even be unconscious.
4 
In the UCS we obtain information on individuals’ predispositions to rely on both 
decision modes. This allows us to classify respondents into three groups: those who rely 
mostly on intuition, those who use both intuition and reasoning and those who rely 
predominantly on deliberative reasoning. We find that attitudes towards risk and ambiguity 
vary significantly with the way individuals make decisions. The survey shows that, relative to 
individuals who use both modes, those who decide predominantly using intuition are less 
likely to be averse to risk and ambiguity. We replicate this finding in two separate experiments 
involving over 1300 participants from universities in Rome, using incentive compatible 
measures of risk and ambiguity aversion and an alternative behavioral measure of decision 
style suggested by previous research (Rubinstein, 2007). 
One interpretation of our results is that intuitive thinkers have a comparative advantage 
in dealing with situations involving risk and uncertainty, as they can react more promptly to 
the limited information available in ambiguous situations. In the last section of the paper we 
provide field-based and experimental evidence supporting this view. For experimental 
evidence, we invited a randomly chosen subset of participants in our main experiments to 
participate in an Iowa Card Task (described below) involving 100 sequential choices under 
uncertainty. We found that participants who relied more on intuition performed significantly 
better in the card task. For corroborating empirical evidence from the field, we follow the 
trading strategies of our sample of investors around the time of the 2008 stock market crash 
and show that investors who rely mainly on intuition were better able to time the market by 
exiting from stocks at a faster pace than deliberative thinkers before the stock market crashed. 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we describe closely related 
literature. In Section 3 we describe our two data sources, the survey data and experimental 
data. Section 4 presents our indicators of risk aversion, ambiguity aversion and thinking mode 
                                                 
4 Recent research comparing how fraternal and paternal twins make decisions suggests that reliance on these 
decision modes has a genetic component and is a stable, individual, trait, see Bouchard and Hur (1998). Our 
experiment shows that decision mode is stable across contexts, and that participants who take longer to reach 
decisions involving uncertain monetary outcomes also took longer to make choices in decisions free of monetary 
consequences (see Table A2 in the Appendix).   9
in the survey. Section 5 shows regressions of the effect of intuition and reasoning on these 
behavioral traits. Section 6 discusses the results of the experiments, confirming the 
relationship between decision style and risk and ambiguity aversion. Section 7 presents the 
results from the Iowa card task and the behavior of investors around the stock market crash. 
Section 8 concludes. 
 
 
2. Related Literature 
 
Our paper is related to several strands of recent literature. There is an emerging literature 
eliciting individual risk preference parameters and characterizing their heterogeneity, either by 
relying on experiments, as in Holt and Laury (2002), or by using large-scale surveys, as 
Barsky et al. (1997), Guiso and Paiella (2008), Dohmen et al. (2011), and Donkers et. al. 
(2001) or large scale field experiments as in Bombardini and Trebbi (2011). Most of this 
literature characterizes risk aversion, but a handful of papers investigate how risk aversion 
correlates with various other preference traits, such as loss aversion, see von Gaudecker et al. 
(2011). Instead, we focus on preferences for risk and ambiguity and study whether and why 
these traits are related. 
A related literature uses theory-guided laboratory experiments presenting individuals 
with a large number of simple portfolio choices involving risky but non-ambiguous assets and 
ambiguous assets with varying prices. Given a specification for preferences under ambiguity, 
observed choices permit the recovery of preference parameters identifying the model that best 
characterizes these choices, as in Bossaerts et al. (2006), Ahn et al. (2007), and Choi et al. 
(2007), Chakravarty and Roy (2006) and Hsu et. al. (2005). Like us, some of these papers 
study whether aversion to risk and to ambiguity are related (Cohen et al., 2011; Chakravarty 
and Roy, 2006, 2009); but differently from them we are also interested in understanding the 
mechanism that links these traits, and in particular whether the architecture of the cognitive 
system plays a role in shaping attitudes towards risk and uncertainty.   10
Several recent papers look at the effect of cognitive ability on risk taking. These papers 
find that higher cognitive ability is associated with a higher propensity to take risk (Frederick, 
2005; Dohmen et. al, 2010) and a lower incidence of behavioral anomalies such as aversion to 
small-stakes risks (Benjamin et. al. 2006). In contrast to these papers which examine how 
differences in ability to reason are related to risk aversion, we focus on how the decision mode 
(intuition or reasoning) affects individual attitudes towards risk and uncertainty. 
Our paper is also related to a recent and burgeoning literature in neuroscience and 
neuroeconomics that studies how people’s brains handle decisions under risk and uncertainty. 
In a famous contribution Bechara et al. (1997) show that individuals with normal IQ and 
reasoning ability, but whose capacity to feel emotions is diminished because of damage to 
their prefrontal cortex, cannot handle uncertainty effectively. Substantial involvement of 
intuitive thinking in decisions involving risk and uncertainty is also consistent with functional 
magnetic resonance studies showing that the orbitofrontal cortex and the amygdala are the 
areas of the brain that are most active when individuals face ambiguous choices (Hsu et. 
al.,2005; Rustichini, 2005). These findings suggest that our results may reflect a comparative 
advantage that intuitive thinkers have in dealing with risk and uncertainty, and that such 
advantage translates into greater tolerance for both.  We contribute to this literature by 
providing new direct evidence on the comparative advantage intuition confers in situations 
involving uncertainty in larger and more representative samples than previous studies. 
Finally, a recent strand of research in psychology argues that human cognitive 
architecture is based on a dual system - two ways of thinking and approaching decisions 
(Kahneman, 2003). The first system, which Stanovich and West (2000) term System 1, 
corresponds to what is commonly called intuition. System 2, on the other hand, handles 
effortful reasoning. Individuals who rely on effortful, deliberative, reasoning carry out 
systematic comparisons of relevant alternatives and assess the pros and cons of each based on 
available information. In contrast, when decisions are based on intuition there is no systematic 
comparison of alternatives: a decision is taken at glance, by rapidly evaluating the main 
features of the problem at hand and achieving a conclusion. Klein (1998; 2003) conjectures a 
direct link between thinking mode and attitudes towards risk and uncertainty by observing that   11
intuitive thinking is uniquely suited to adventurous behavior and risk taking. The key point is 
that intuition can handle severe uncertainty so that individuals who are better at using System 
1 may also feel more comfortable dealing with uncertainty and risk (though no distinction is 
made between the two) and thus develop higher tolerance for both. It is this feeling of comfort 
with detection and learning about risks that could make intuitive thinkers more tolerant to risk 
and uncertainty.  
 
3. The survey and experimental data 
We use two sources of data. The first source is the second wave of the Unicredit Clients' 
Survey (UCS) which was run between June and September 2007. The survey is comprised of 
interviews with a sample of 1,686 Italian customers of Unicredit, one of the largest European 
Banking groups. The sample was stratified according to three criteria: geographical area, city 
size, and financial wealth. To be included in the survey, customers must have had at least 
10,000 euros worth of assets with Unicredit at the end of 2006. The survey is described in 
greater detail in the Appendix 1 or in Alvarez, Guiso and Lippi (2011). 
Besides collecting detailed demographic information and data on investors’ financial 
investments, the survey collected data on the way respondents handle decisions—whether by 
reliance on intuition or by effortful reasoning—as well as indicators of various attitudes that 
have a bearing on financial decisions and, more generally, on decisions under risk and 
uncertainty. Here we focus on two prominent attitudes that have been cited to characterize 
decisions under risk and uncertainty: risk aversion and ambiguity aversion. 
Our second source of data is two experiments we conducted on-line in 2009 and 2010. 
Participants in both experiments were recruited from among college students attending one of 
two universities in Rome, Italy: LUISS Guido Carli or La Sapienza. In total, we have data for 
1,306 students.  Each participant completed exactly one of the two experiments. The 
experiments allow us to construct incentive-compatible measures of risk and ambiguity 
aversion as well as alternative, more objective, measures of participants’ primary decision 
modes and favorability towards relying on intuition. Details on the design of the experiments, 
the measures of preferences for risk and ambiguity as well as the measures of decision mode   12
that we collected appear in the Appendix.  Experimental instructions are available from the 
authors upon request. 
The survey and experimental data should be viewed as complementary. The main 
advantage of the survey is the heterogeneity of the sample which involves true investors and 
comes close to being representative of the population of Italian investors (see Alvarez et. al, 
2011). The main drawback of the survey data is that because of time and space limitations the 
questions that can be asked in a general purpose survey are limited and normally involve only 
self-assessed descriptions when measuring decision mode or hypothetical situations when 
eliciting risk and ambiguity preferences. Hence, the measures of aversion to risk and 
ambiguity may not be incentive compatible. The main advantage of the experiment is its 
narrow focus making it possible to dig deeper and obtain measures of intuitive thinking using 
different methodologies. Additionally, monetary incentives in the experiments were designed 
to make truthful revelation of risk and ambiguity preferences optimal. The main drawback of 
the experiment is that participants are students, which limits the study of the relationship 
between wealth and attitudes toward risk and uncertainty. 
 
4. Thinking mode and attitudes towards risk in the survey data 
4.1. Measuring decision mode: intuition and reasoning 
Even though the dual system is a feature of all individuals, people differ in the 
prevalence of one system or another when making decisions (Stanovich and West, 2000; 
Klein, 2003). Some individuals make decisions only after a thorough processing of all 
available information and a systematic comparison of the potential alternatives, even at the 
cost of possibly losing an opportunity by waiting to make a decision. Others decide quickly, 
even (or perhaps even more) when faced with complex problems, processing at glance the 
little information at hand and coming up with a choice. Thus, to establish whether thinking 
mode affects attitudes towards risk we can use variation in the reliance on the two systems 
across individuals. To understand how people make decisions and who relies more on System 
1 or 2, UCS respondents were asked the following question: 
   13
“Think of when you make a decision. Generally speaking, do you tend to decide rather quickly 
relying mostly on your intuition or rather do you tend to think accurately about all possible 
alternatives and consequences of your choice, taking as much time as needed before reaching 
a final decision?” 
 
Respondents can answer in three ways: (1) I decide very rapidly on the basis of my intuition; 
(2) I partly ponder and partly rely on intuition; (3) I ponder accurately, reasoning carefully 
about my choice.” 
 
This question allows us to define two dummy variables, classifying survey participants 
into groups that differ in the prevalence of intuitive thinking versus reasoning. Table 1 shows 
that the fraction of intuitive thinkers is 15 percent, while the fraction of those who use 
predominantly deliberative reasoning is 43 percent (the residual fraction relying on both 
intuition and reasoning is 42 percent.  
For this indicator to be a valid measure of the decision mode, two conditions must hold. 
First, since the indicator is based on self-reported information, one has to trust that people are 
consciously aware of how they typically approach decisions. Second, since we rely on cross-
sectional differences on how individuals make decisions, the underlying assumption is that 
there are systematic differences in the mode of thinking across individuals and that, even if all 
people clearly use both intuition and reasoning, in some individuals intuitive thinking is more 
prevalent than in others. That is, reliance on intuition versus reasoning must be, at least to 
some extent, an individual trait. Evidence from twins studies points to a strong genetic 
component in the way people make decisions, suggesting that decision mode is indeed a stable 
trait (Bouchard and Hur, 1998).
5 That individuals are consciously aware of this trait is 
supported by the evidence in our experiments which shows that the self-reported measure is 
significantly correlated with objective measures of decision style (Section 6).  
 
4.2. Measuring attitudes towards risk and ambiguity 
                                                 
5 Stanovich and West (2000) also provide evidence supporting this assumption. They argue that the systematic 
differences in performance along a large variety of tasks that they document in a sample of individuals can be 
traced to differences in the prevalence of one of the two systems of thinking, System 1 (based on intuition) or 2 
(based on reasoning). Similarly, Klein (2003) offers many examples consistent with the idea that individuals 
differ systematically in their willingness to rely on intuition to make decisions.    14
We measure risk attitudes in two ways. First, the survey has a qualitative indicator of 
risk tolerance patterned after the US Survey of Consumer Finance: 
 
Which of the following statements comes closest to the amount of financial risk that you are 
willing to take when you make your financial investment: (1) a very high return, with a very 
high risk of losing money; (2) high return and high risk; (3) moderate return and moderate 
risk; (4) low return and no risk. 
 
From this question we construct a categorical variable ranging from 1 to 4 with larger 
values corresponding to greater dislike for risk. Only 1.8 percent chooses “a very high return, 
with a very high risk”; 28 percent choose “high return and high risk;” most are moderately risk 
or strongly risk averse (52 and 19 percent, respectively).
6 
(a)  The question allows us to classify risk attitudes but not to distinguish 
absolute and relative attitudes towards risk. Since we observe income and wealth in the 
data, we could purge the risk aversion indicator from differences in endowments. 
However, we also use a second measure that allows us to classify individuals 
according to their relative risk aversion. This relies on questions similar to those 
analyzed by Barsky et al. (1997) in the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, where 
individuals are asked to choose among different lifetime earnings profiles. In 
particular, the UCS asks: 
 
Suppose you are the only income earner in your family and must change jobs. You can choose 
between two options: 
 
A.   With firm A you will make the same wage that you make today for sure; 
B.   With firm B you have a 50% chance of making twice as much as in your current job and 
a 50% chance of seeing it reduced by 1/3.  
 
Which of the two opportunities do you choose? 
 
                                                 
6 A recent literature on eliciting preferences from survey data shows that qualitative questions on risk aversion 
are informative and have predictive power on behavior, see Barsky et al. (1997), Guiso and Paiella (2008), 
Dohmen et. al. (2011).   15
If they chose A they are then asked: If by choosing firm B you had as before a 50% chance of 
doubling your wage but with probability 50% you could see it reduced by ¼ (instead of 1/3), 
would you still choose firm A? (Yes, No) 
 
If they chose B then they are asked: If by choosing firm B you had as before a 50% chance of 
doubling your wage but a 50% probability of seeing it reduced by 50% (instead of 1/3), would 
you still choose firm B? (Yes, No) 
(b)   
(c)  From the answers to this question we obtain a second categorical 
variable, also taking values from 1 to 4 and increasing in the degree of relative risk 
aversion. 
(d)  Ambiguity aversion reflects a dislike for situations where individuals are 
uncertain about the probabilities of outcomes rather than, or in addition to, the aversion 
they may have to the variability in outcomes. In recent years several studies have 
provided a theoretical basis for aversion to ambiguity and have characterized 
preferences that separate ambiguity aversion from risk aversion. For example 
Maccheroni et al. (2005) and Ghirardato et. al. (2004) study preference representations 
where aversion to ambiguity is identified by a single parameter that is distinguished 
from risk aversion. We construct a dummy variable indicating whether individuals are 
averse to ambiguity using a question in the UCS based on the original Ellsberg (1961) 
thought experiment: 
 
Suppose you face two urns each with 100 balls. The first urn has 100 balls, some are red some 
are black but you do not know how many are red and how many are black. The second urn has 
100 balls: 50 red and 50 black. One ball is drawn from the urn that you choose and you will 
win 1,000 Euros if the ball is of the color that you choose. Choose the color. Now tell me 
whether you prefer to have the ball drawn from the first of the second urn. Choose one of the 
following options: 
 
1.  A strong preference for the first urn. 
2.  A slight preference for the first urn. 
3.  Indifferent between the two urns. 
4.  A slight preference for the second urn. 
5.  A strong preference for the second urn. 
   16
We classify those who answer 4 or 5 as ambiguity averse. The majority (52 percent) is 
averse to ambiguity either strongly (32 percent) or slightly (19.5 percent). One fourth is 
indifferent between the two urns suggesting that they are ambiguity neutral. Only 13 percent 
prefers the ambiguous urn. However, without knowing why they prefer this urn, we cannot 
classify these individuals’ ambiguity preferences.
7. 
The pattern of responses is similar to that obtained in experiments where individuals face 
a choice between risky and ambiguous prospects. In particular, it is common to find that some 
individuals have a preference for ambiguous lotteries.
8 For instance Halevy (2007) finds that 
in an experiment involving 104 individuals who are asked to choose between an ambiguous 
urn and a risky urn, 61 percent are ambiguity averse, 22 percent ambiguity are neutral and 17 
percent prefer the ambiguous urn. The UCS is the first survey to ask Ellsberg-type questions in 
a large sample of heterogeneous individuals and thus the first to allow correlating attitudes 
towards ambiguity with observable characteristics and other attitudes towards risk. 
 
5. Results from survey data 
To show the link between risk attitudes and decision style we construct two dummies, 
one for intuitive thinking (equal to 1 for those who rely mostly on intuition, and zero 
otherwise) and one for deliberative reasoning (equal to 1 for those who rely mostly on 
reasoning, and zero otherwise). The comparison group includes respondents who rely on both 
intuition and reasoning. For each attitude we run a regression on the two dummies for thinking 
mode and a set of additional variables that capture observable heterogeneity that may be 
relevant for that attitude. In particular, we control for age, gender, marital status, education 
                                                 
7 These individuals could simply believe that the ambiguous urn has a more favorable distribution, for whatever 
reason. While such unwarranted optimism with respect to the ambiguous urn seems akin to ambiguity loving, it 
does not fit with any theoretical definition of ambiguity-loving that we know of and hence we do not classify it as 
such. 
8 There are several alternatives to obtaining an index of ambiguity aversion. One is to ask individuals, as we do, 
to choose between a risky lottery and an ambiguous lottery; an alternative, followed for example by Guiso et al 
(2007) and Halevy (2007), is to ask the willingness to pay for lotteries involving risk and involving ambiguity 
and then back out a measure of ambiguity aversion from the reported prices. A third, recently developed 
methodology (Bossaerts et al, 2006; Ahn et al, 2007; Choi et al, 2007) faces individuals in lab experiments with a 
large number of simple portfolio choices involving risky but non-ambiguous and ambiguous assets with varying 
prices. Individual preference parameters are then retrieved from these choices. Each of these approaches has pros 
and cons discussed in Section 6.    17
and region of residence. We also construct a measure of each household’s total wealth and 
include its log as a further control (see Appendix for details and Table 1, panel D for summary 
statistics).  
 
5.1. Risk aversion 
Table 2 reports the coefficients and standard errors of an ordered probit model for the 
qualitative indicator of risk aversion. The first column presents a regression of risk aversion on 
the two dummies of intuitive thinking and reasoning. Reliance on intuition is associated with 
lower risk aversion compared to individuals who use both intuition and reasoning, but the 
effect is not statistically different from zero. On the other hand, a predominant reliance on 
reasoning is associated with significantly higher levels of risk aversion. 
To give a sense of the economic importance of thinking mode we compute the marginal 
effects of relying on intuition and reasoning. Our estimates imply that individuals who rely 
mostly on reasoning are 5.8 percentage points more likely to be in the most risk-averse group 
(those preferring low return and no risk) than those who use both reasoning and intuition, 
which is about one third of the unconditional proportion of individuals in this group. 
Column 2 adds demographic variables to the baseline specification. As in previous 
studies risk aversion increases with age and is significantly lower for males and more educated 
individuals (e.g. Barsky et al, 1997; Guiso and Paiella, 2008; Dohmen et al, 2011). However, 
the size and significance of the coefficients of thinking mode are not affected. In fact, thinking 
mode is poorly correlated with demographic characteristics (age or gender), despite the 
somewhat popular idea that women are more “intuitive” than men. In the third column we add 
the log of total wealth as an additional control. Higher wealth is associated with lower risk 
aversion, as suggested by plausible representations of attitudes towards risk, but again the 
effect of the thinking mode dummies is unaffected. 
Table 3 reports the results of an ordered probit model with relative risk aversion as the 
dependent variable. The results are similar to Table 2: deliberative respondents (those who 
rely mostly on reasoning) are significantly more risk averse than those who rely both on 
reasoning and intuition. Demographic variables also induce similar effects except that here,   18
wealth has no predictive power on relative risk aversion which is consistent with preferences 
exhibiting constant relative risk aversion. Turning our attention to economic significance, we 
see again that a deliberative thinking mode has a substantial impact, raising the probability of 
being in the highest relative risk aversion group by 8 percentage points (15 percent of the 
sample mean). 
A possible concern with our findings is that decision mode indicator captures cognitive 
ability, which has been found to be positively correlated with risk tolerance (Frederick, 2005; 
Benjamin et al., 2007; Burks et. al (2009), Dohmen et al (2010); ). We have several answers to 
this concern. First, in the same literature cognitive ability is identified with reasoning ability. 
For instance, Benjamin et al. (2007) find that mathematical ability is strongly negatively 
correlated with risk aversion. Insofar as being better at reasoning implies relying more on it, 
we should find a negative effect of our reasoning dummy on risk aversion, not positive. 
Second, if our measure of thinking mode was capturing cognitive ability one would 
expect to find a positive correlation between reliance on reasoning and education if only 
because IQ test scores are highly correlated with educational attainment. Instead we find a 
small and negative correlation (-0.054). 
Third, if our measure of thinking mode reflects cognitive ability we should find a 
correlation of this measure with individual time discounts. In fact, Frederick (2005), Benjamin 
et al. (2006), Burks et al (2009) and Dohmen et al (2010) find that people with better cognitive 
ability, besides being less risk averse, are also more patient. However, when we use a measure 
of subjective time discounting present in the UCS we find no statistically significant effect of 
intuition and reasoning.
9 For all of these reasons, we conclude that our measure of thinking 
mode reflects the way individuals approach decisions rather than their cognitive ability.  
 
                                                 
9 The UCS asked survey participants to choose between €100,000 one year from the interview and an immediate 
sum M<100,000. The initial value of M is set at €95,000. If the respondent accepts (turns down) 95,000 now she 
is asked whether she would accept 90,000 now (respectively 97,000); if she accepts 90,000 (turns down 97,000) 
she is further asked whether she would accept 80,000 now (respectively 98,000). If she turns down 80,000 her 
discount rate is above 20%; if she turns down 98,000 the alternative offered is to wait one year and get 100,000. 
This allows classifying respondents into 6 categories with increasing subjective discount rates. In an ordered 
probit regression of this indicator of subjective discount the dummy for intuition has a small positive coefficient 
and that for reasoning small and negative but none of them is statistically significant (t-stat of 0.61 and -1.02, 
respectively).   19
5.2. Ambiguity aversion 
Table 4 reports estimates of the probability of being ambiguity averse. We estimate a 
probit model using the dummy for ambiguity aversion as the dependent variable. The dummy 
takes the value of one if a respondent is classified as ambiguity averse and zero otherwise. 
Column 1 shows that thinking mode has a strong and statistically significant effect on the 
probability of being ambiguity averse. Intuitive thinkers are much less likely to be averse to 
ambiguity than people who decide using both intuition and reasoning. On the other hand, 
deliberative thinkers are much more likely to be ambiguity averse. These patterns are 
unchanged when we control for demographic variables (column 2) or wealth (column 3). The 
marginal effects of thinking mode are again large: reliance on intuition lowers the probability 
of being ambiguity averse by about 13 percentage points, which is about one third of the 
sample proportion of ambiguity averse respondents. 
One interpretation of the positive correlation between intuition and ambiguity tolerance 
is that intuitive thinking proxies for impulsivity and, at the same time, impulsive individuals 
are more likely to make mistakes, as shown in Frederick (2005). Following this argument, one 
could argue that intuitive individuals choose the ambiguous lottery more often by mistake, 
because, being less patient, they make decisions too fast and are thus more exposed to 
mistakes. If this were the case we should find a strong correlation between our thinking mode 
indicator and subjective discount. Contrary to this argument, we find no correlation as was 
shown at the end of Section 5.1. 
The correlation between ambiguity aversion, demographic variables and wealth is 
interesting in its own right. As far as we know, most existing evidence on aversion to 
ambiguity has been obtained from experiments with little variation in individual 
characteristics and, so far, no evidence is available on the relationship between ambiguity 
aversion and wealth. Differently from attitudes towards risk, we find in Table 4 that age and 
gender are unrelated with ambiguity aversion (columns 2 and 3). We find a mild effect of 
education and marital status: more educated individuals are more likely to be averse to 
ambiguity, as are married people (column 2). Only the effect of marital status survives when 
we control for wealth, however (column 3).   20
Interestingly, the effect of wealth on the probability of being ambiguity averse is positive 
(column 3). Neither theory nor introspection provides hints about how attitudes toward 
Knightian uncertainty should vary with wealth, making it difficult to interpret this correlation. 
However, it may not be unreasonable that it is the wealthy that are particularly afraid of 
unknown outcome probabilities: after all, a wrong decision when probabilities are unknown 
may transform a rich man into a poor man, but can only transform a poor man into a (still) 
poor man. 
The positive correlation between wealth and ambiguity aversion could have important 
implications for portfolio choice and assets pricing. First, since the wealthy hold a substantial 
portion of assets, it is their preferences that mostly matter for the pricing of risk. If aversion to 
ambiguity and wealth are positively correlated, the correlation may help account for a large 
equity premium if equity happens to be ambiguous, even if relative risk aversion does not vary 
with wealth. Secondly, it may explain why, even at high levels of wealth, in many countries 
people fail to participate in the stock market.  This fact is hard to rationalize with a fixed cost 
of participation (Guiso et al. 2008), but is not inconsistent with aversion to ambiguity, as 
shown by Dow et al. (1992), Bewley (1998) and Epstein and Schneider (2010). 
 
6. The experiments 
Like most experiments, our pool of participants lacks the heterogeneity in individual 
characteristics necessary to uncover many of the interesting relationships we found using the 
UCS data. There is little variation in age or education level, and the variation we observe in 
income is not participants’ income but rather their parents’ income. Nevertheless, our 
experimental data allow us to provide evidence that the phenomenon at the center of our 
current inquiry—that differences across individuals in their predominant mode of think lead to 
predictable variation in risk and ambiguity aversion—is robust. We find a significant 
relationship between risk and ambiguity aversion and decision mode even in this vastly 
different experimental population, and even though decisions are not purely hypothetical. 
Below we describe our experimental measures of thinking mode and risk and ambiguity 
aversion. For details on the experimental designs see the Appendix.   21
6.1 Measures of thinking mode in the experiments 
In the experiment we use one main measure of thinking mode but collect data on two 
other measures to validate the first. As our main measure we exploit a fundamental difference 
between the intuitive and deliberative systems. Since the intuitive system in the brain is 
relatively fast, individuals who rely more on intuition than on effortful, deliberative, reasoning 
should reach decisions more quickly than their deliberative counterparts. This is consistent 
with Rubinstein (2007), where the author documents variation in decision time across types of 
decisions: decisions which involve cognitive reasoning take longer than decisions that are 
primarily instinctive or intuitive. In our study, we fix the type of decision and use variation in 
response time as a measure of how much an individual is engaging his or her deliberative 
versus intuitive facilities. 
In particular, we record the amount of time in seconds that each participant takes to 
reach decisions in choices involving risk and uncertainty.
10 We measure the time participants 
spent on two questions used in our ambiguity preferences elicitation procedure. These two 
questions involve real monetary stakes in the context of risk and ambiguity. For details of the 
exact questions used, see the Appendix. 
From the time it takes participants to complete these two questions we construct a 3-
category thinking mode classification analogous to the self-reported measure in the UCS by 
labeling subjects according to how relatively quickly they answered. A participant is labeled 
“intuitive” if his or her decision time was in the bottom quartile of response times—i.e., if he 
or she made decisions relatively quickly. We label those in the top quartile “deliberative.” To 
create a comparison group, all other participants are labeled “partially deliberative.”
11 
To validate this behavioral measure of thinking mode we construct two additional 
thinking mode measures. First of all, we collect the same self-reported 3-category measure of 
                                                 
10 We collect decision time data for all sections of each experiment.  In our analysis, we focus on decisions 
involving real monetary stakes and which involve risk and uncertainty.  We focus on these questions because 
they are central to our investigation.  However, the patterns in decision time and thinking mode are present in 
other sections of the experiment that do not involve monetary stakes, risk or uncertainty (see, e.g., Section 7, 
below) providing some reassurance that decision time is a stable individual trait.  
11 Comparisons are strictly within-experiment as the questions used to elicit ambiguity aversion, and hence 
construct our decision style measure, differ across experiments. That is to say, an Experiment 1 participant’s 
response time is only compared to the response times of other Experiment 1 participants.   22
thinking mode as in the UCS. Secondly, we collect a widely-used psychological measure of 
intuitive and deliberative thinking: the 40-item Rational Experiential Inventory (REI in Pacini 
and Epstein, 1999). We focus on the most relevant 10-item subscale which measures an 
individual’s favorability towards relying on intuition. Using these subscales, we classify 
participants as “high-intuitive” if they score in the top 25
th percentile on this subscale relative 
to other participants in the same experiment (i.e., Experiment 1 or 2), and “low-intuitive” if 
their scores are in the bottom 25
th percentile.   
We do not use these latter two measures directly as we have concerns about their validity 
in the context of our experiments which involves only students. Specifically, we feel that 
students are generally encouraged to think of themselves as deliberative, effortful reasoners 
which may color self-assessments. On the other hand, our behavioral decision-time measure of 
thinking mode should suffer to a lesser extent, if at all, from such self-image biases.  Still, it is 
worth noting that both the self-reported 3-category measure of thinking mode and the thinking 
mode measure we construct from the REI are highly significant predictors of our behavioral 
decision style measure.
12 This suggests all three measures are capturing a common and 
prevalent phenomenon. 
 
6.2 Measures of risk and ambiguity aversion 
To measure risk aversion, in both experiments we use a procedure due to Holt and Laury 
(2002). Briefly, participants face a sequence of choices between two binary lotteries: lottery A 
and lottery B. Lottery A features a high maximum payoff (€38.50) but a low minimum payoff 
(€0.10), while lottery B features a lower maximum payoff but a higher minimum payoff (€20 
and €16, respectively). There is a known probability p of the high payoff in both lotteries. 
Participants choose between lotteries A and B in each of a sequence of 10 decisions where the 
probability of the high payoff, p, is increased from 0.1 to 1 in steps of 0.1. The decision in this 
                                                 
12 We ran several ordered probit regressions featuring our main thinking mode measure on the left hand side and, 
on the right hand side, sets of dummies for either or both of these other two thinking mode measures.  With or 
without controlling for demographics, the results show that each of these other two measures of thinking mode is 
a significant predictor of our main thinking mode measure.  This is true whether controlling for both of the other 
thinking mode measures simultaneously, or whether they enter one at a time into the regressions. These estimates 
are not reported, but are available upon request.   23
sequence where an individual switches from preferring lottery B to preferring lottery A is our 
measure of risk aversion, which takes values from 1 to 10 and is increasing in risk aversion.
13 
Because measuring ambiguity aversion is trickier than measuring risk aversion, we use 
two different elicitation procedures. In Experiment 1 we use an urn-valuation procedure 
pioneered by Halevy (2007). In Experiment 2, we measure ambiguity preferences more 
directly by letting participants choose between lotteries involving either risk or ambiguity. 
This second procedure has two main advantages: it is simpler to implement and, at the same 
time, allows identification of ambiguity-loving behavior which is not possible with the Halevy 
procedure. 
The ambiguity preference elicitation procedure used in Experiment 1 proceeds in two-
phases. In the first phase, two urns are described to participants: one (non-ambiguous) urn 
contains 5 red balls and 5 white balls; the other (ambiguous) urn contains exactly 10 balls, 
each of which is either red or white, but the number of red or white balls is unknown. It is 
explained that the computer will choose one ball at random from each of the two urns, and that 
the participant must guess which color ball will be drawn from each of the two urns. Each 
correct guess pays €20, while incorrect guesses pay nothing. In the second phase of the 
procedure participants state the minimum amount of money they would accept in exchange for 
the right to collect the earnings from each of their two bets, separately. This “minimum 
willingness-to-accept” is elicited using a Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (1964) mechanism which 
provides incentives for truthful reporting.
14 The difference in a participant’s valuations of their 
                                                 
13 In Experiment 1, participants were asked to decide on each of the separate lotteries separately, where the order 
in which lotteries was presented was randomized.  If there are multiple switching points, we follow much of the 
literature in characterizing an individual’s risk preferences by the first switch point (i.e., the lowest p for which 
lottery A is preferred to lottery B).  In Experiment 2 participants were presented one table containing all 10 
lotteries—ordered increasing in p—and asked to indicate the lowest p at which they preferred lottery A to lottery 
B. Both of these procedures are common in the literature and using both here provides an extra robustness check 
on our results. 
14 For each of the two urn-guesses, separately, the procedure is as follows: the computer draws a number between 
0 and 20 which can be thought of as a “price.” If this price is higher than the participant’s stated minimum 
willingness-to-accept, the participant receives a payment equal (in euros) to the price but gives up his or her right 
to the earnings from the urn-guess. Otherwise the participant retains the right to the earnings from his or her urn-
guess. This mechanism provides incentives for participants to truthfully state their values for each of the bets 
irrespective of risk preferences. Since the main concern with this mechanism is that it is relatively complicated, 
each participant had to pass a short quiz about the procedure immediately before stating their minimum-  24
bet on ambiguous urn and their bet on the risky urn is an indicator of ambiguity aversion. 
Those who value the bet related to the ambiguous urn strictly less are labeled ambiguity 
averse.
15 
In Experiment 2, we describe to participants the same two urns used in Experiment 1. 
They are then told that one ball will be drawn from one of the two urns. They must choose 
which of the two urns the ball is extracted from and will win €20 if the extracted ball is red.  
Participants are then asked to consider the same two urns and given a second, nearly identical, 
choice: they must choose one of the two urns to extract a ball from and will win €20 if the 
color of the extracted ball is white.
16  We label those who choose the non-ambiguous urn both 
times ambiguity averse and those who choose the ambiguous urn both times ambiguity-loving.  
All other participants are labeled ambiguity neutral.  
Table 5 gives descriptive statistics for our decision mode measures as well as participant 
demographics. 
 
6.3. Experimental results 
Results from both experiments confirm the main findings in the survey data. Participants 
labeled more intuitive by our behavioral measure of thinking mode are both less risk averse 
and less likely to be ambiguity averse than partially deliberative individuals. Furthermore, in 
Experiment 2 where ambiguity-loving can be identified, the results suggest that being an 
intuitive thinker both significantly reduces ambiguity aversion and significantly increases 
                                                                                                                                            
willingness-to-accept values.  Participants who failed the quiz re-took it until they passed before being allowed to 
proceed. 
15 While it is tempting to label as “ambiguity-loving” those who value the bet related to the ambiguous urn 
strictly more, this is not possible. For example, an individual could simply believe that there is a larger proportion 
of red balls in the ambiguous urn, and therefore value a bet of “red from the ambiguous urn” more highly than a 
bet on either color ball from the non-ambiguous urn. This is a perfectly valid subjective belief that would be 
consistent with strictly valuing a bet on the ambiguous urn more. We thank David K. Levine for pointing this out 
to us. 
16 In particular, they are told to consider exactly the same two urns.  Note that in each choice indifference 
between the two urns is a valid option. It is explained that if a participant specifies that they are indifferent 
between the two urns then one of the two urns will be randomly chosen and that, in addition to whatever 
winnings are associated with extracting a ball from this randomly-chosen urn, he or she will earn a small fixed 
fee (€0.10). This ensures that stated urn preferences are strict.  Finally, participants know that only one of the two 
questions can be chosen to count towards their earnings so whether the draw in the second question is carried out 
with or without replacement should not be an issue.   25
ambiguity-loving.
17 These patterns prove robust to controlling for relevant demographic 
determinants of risk and ambiguity aversion such as gender and parents’ income and, as in the 
survey, when controlling for a measure of cognitive ability.
18  Also, it should be noted that 
although we present results for each experiment separately for transparency nothing changes 
qualitatively if we conduct our analyses on the pooled data from both experiments.  In 
particular, the significance patterns remain virtually the same. 
Table 6 presents regressions of risk aversion on thinking mode for both experiments 
separately. Negative and significant coefficients on the dummy for intuitive thinkers indicate 
that intuitive thinkers are significantly less risk averse than partially deliberative thinkers (the 
excluded category), while positive and significant coefficients on our deliberative indicator 
imply deliberative thinkers are more risk averse than those who rely on both deliberative and 
intuitive thinking. 
Similarly, Table 7 demonstrates that being an intuitive thinker significantly reduces the 
likelihood of being ambiguity averse and increases one’s chances of being ambiguity loving 
relative to partially deliberative thinkers. Computing the marginal effects of decision mode on 
ambiguity preferences reveals an impact strikingly similar to the analogous estimates in our 
survey results: controlling for demographics, being an intuitive thinker reduces the probability 
of being ambiguity averse by 9.2 percentage points in Experiment 1 and 11.7 percentage 
points in Experiment 2. Furthermore, in Experiment 2 where constructing an indicator of 
                                                 
17 As in the survey, one may be concerned that our intuitive thinkers are simply more prone to make mistakes and 
this is why they appear more risk tolerant and less ambiguity averse in our data.  As detailed in the Appendix, we 
implement our risk aversion elicitation procedure in two slightly different ways, so that mistakes should manifest 
themselves differently across experiments.  For example, making a mistake in the risk preferences elicitation 
procedure used in Experiment 2 is equally likely to mis-classify an individual as risk loving as it is to mis-classify 
an individual as risk averse. It is also not clear whether mistakes could explain the patterns in ambiguity 
preferences given our two different elicitation mechanisms.  In particular, being classified as ambiguity loving 
requires consistent answers across two separate questions, reducing the likelihood that such classification is 
solely due to mistakes.  Finally, the idea that intuitive thinkers are simply more prone to mistakes is not 
consistent with the evidence in the Iowa Card Task experiment in Section 7, where intuitive thinkers perform 
better than deliberative and partially deliberative thinkers. 
18 Here our cognitive ability measure is a participant’s score on a standardized mathematics exam given in the 
final year of high school in Italy. The correlation between cognitive ability and our main thinking mode variable 
is non-significant in both experiments:  0.017 (p > 0.7) in Experiment 1 and -0.034 (p > 0.35) in Experiment 2. 
This suggests that our behavioral decision mode measure is not simply a proxy for cognitive ability.   26
ambiguity loving is possible, we find that the marginal effect of being an intuitive thinker is to 
increase the probability of being ambiguity loving by 11.4 percentage points.  
 
7. Performance in uncertain environments 
So far, our analysis with survey and experimental data shows that decision mode and 
attitudes toward risk and ambiguity are correlated. One reason this may occur is that intuitive 
thinkers are more comfortable in situations involving risk and uncertainty because reliance on 
intuition provides a comparative advantage. If this is the case, we should find that intuitive 
thinkers perform better in uncertain situations. In this section we provide evidence confirming 
this prediction. Our first source of evidence is experimental, while our second source comes 
from data collected about actual investment decisions. 
To obtain an experimental measure of performance, we invited a random sub-sample of 
participants in Experiments 1 and 2 to participate in an Iowa Gambling Task. In total, 168 
students participated. Each participant was given an endowment of 10 euros and presented 
with four card decks on his or her computer screen.
19 Each participant selected cards, one at a 
time, from any of the four decks by clicking.
20 Participants knew nothing about the card decks, 
i.e. they operated in a completely ambiguous environment. Unbeknownst to participants: i) 
two of the four card decks were programmed to yield a positive expected return; ii) the other 
two decks yielded a negative expected return; and iii) each participant would get a total of 100 
draws from the four card decks.
21 All participants were actually paid their earnings from the 
card task. To classify participants in terms of decision mode, we use their behavioral decision 
mode indicator from Experiment 1 or 2. 
                                                 
19 The Iowa Card Task experiment was programmed and conducted with the software z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007). 
20 The decks were pre-programmed to be identical to the decks used in the original Iowa Gambling Task (Bechara 
et al., 1994). 
21 The exact order of wins and losses in each deck was pre-randomized, so that everybody faced the exact same 
decks. The two bad decks were pre-programmed to pay -100 points every 10 draws, while the good decks paid 
+250 points every 10 draws. Participants started with 2000 points which were converted to euros at a rate of 200 
points = 1 euro. The order in which the good decks and bad decks appeared on the computer screen was also 
randomized to avoid any ease-of-clicking confound. For example, each participant was faced with four card 
decks, but one participant might face the order: Good Deck, Bad Deck, Good Deck, Bad Deck; while another 
participant could have faced the order: Good Deck, Bad Deck, Bad Deck, Good Deck.   27
Figure 1 presents the average proportion of draws from good decks for 10-card decision 
blocks by decision mode. For example, intuitive thinkers drew, on average, about 56 percent 
of their first 10 cards from good decks (or 5.6 cards), while deliberative thinkers managed to 
draw only about 42 percent of their first 10 cards from good decks. From Figure 1 it is evident 
that intuitive thinkers generally outperformed deliberative thinkers in this ambiguity-laden 
task. Table 8 makes this comparison more formal: intuitive thinkers drew significantly more 
cards from good decks compared to all other participants. On average, controlling for 
demographics, intuitive thinkers drew about 7.4 percent more cards from good decks than 
partially deliberative thinkers who managed to draw about 53.7 percent of their cards from 
good decks.
22 There was no significant difference between the performance of deliberative 
thinkers and partially deliberative thinkers, as is also evident in Figure 1. 
Our second source of evidence combines the UCS survey data with a panel of 
administrative data having detailed information on respondents’ financial portfolios. Data are 
available at a monthly frequency starting in December 2006 until October 2009. Thus, they 
cross the Great Recession. Specifically, for each of 26 asset classes we know the value of each 
individual’s holdings at the end of each month and the net flow in each month. Because we 
observe the net assets flows we can identify net trades. 
We consider market timing in the months preceding the collapse of Lehman Brothers, a 
situation involving substantial Knightian uncertainty (Caballero, 2009; Caballero and Simsek, 
2011). If in situations rife with ambiguity intuitive stockholders elaborate an effective decision 
more quickly than deliberative investors, we expect that they make good use of this ability and 
exit the market before the collapse of Lehman Brothers at a faster pace than deliberative 
stockholders. That is, conditional on selling stocks they should rather sell at a faster rate 
before the collapse than after. Figure 2 gives a graphical illustration of this phenomenon. It 
plots the differences in the fractions of intuitive and deliberative stockholders who held stocks 
in December 2006 and who sold stocks in subsequent months. The vertical bar identifies the 
collapse of Lehman. The figure shows that intuitive thinkers are more likely to have sold 
stocks before the collapse of the stock market than deliberative investors: in 17 of the 21 
                                                 
22 This difference is statistically significant at the 1% level using simple OLS with standard errors clustered by 
session. Demographic controls include age, gender, family income and a measure of cognitive ability.   28
months before the Lehman collapse intuitive investors were strictly more likely to have sold 
stocks. After Lehman there is no difference between the two groups. Table 9 shows this more 
formally. It reports estimates of the following linear probability model: 
 
>@ (before intuitive ) (1 before ) intuitive before (1 before ) it t it t it t t it it s Zu DE J G O           
 
where it s  is a dummy equal to one if investor i sells stocks in month t; sell before equals one 
before the Lehmann shock, intuitive equals one for intuitive investors, and Z is a vector of 
additional control variables. The coefficient D measures any extra tendency to sell stocks by 
intuitive investors before the collapse of the market relatively to the mean rate at which 
stockholders were selling stocks, measured byJ . Parameter E  measures this tendency but 
after the collapse relatively to the means rate at which investors were selling, measured byG . 
A positive value of D and a zero value of E would be evidence that intuitive investors perform 
better at timing the market than deliberative ones. 
The estimates in column (1) are consistent with this hypothesis. Intuitive investors are 
1.4 percentage points more likely to sell stocks before Lehman’s collapse than the average (5.7 
percent). After the collapse they sell at the same rate as deliberative investors. This result 
holds if we add demographic variables and investors’ wealth (column 2) and it is not due to 
the intuitive dummy capturing some other dimensions of ability, or greater financial 
information. In the remaining columns we add interaction terms between the before and (1-
before) dummies with a measure of education (column 3) and proxies for financial literacy 
(column 4); a self-reported measure for financial capability (column 5); and the time spent 
gathering financial information (column 6). None of these variables gives an advantage in 
timing the market, while the effect of intuitive thinking before Lehman is always significant.  
 
8. Conclusions 
The paper documents substantial individual heterogeneity in the two attitudes that have 
been used to characterize choice under risk and uncertainty. Most individuals dislike risk as 
well as ambiguity, but the intensity varies with observable characteristics. The two attitudes   29
are not independent. Empirically, individuals who dislike risk more are also more likely to be 
averse to ambiguity, as also documented by Hsu et al. (2005) and Bossaerts et al. (2006). 
Expanding these latter results, we show that a common factor linking these attitudes is the 
predominant way in which people handle decisions: whether by intuitive thinking or through 
effortful reasoning. 
We find that predominant thinking mode is systematically related to how much people 
dislike risk and whether they are averse to ambiguity. Intuitive thinkers are more willing to 
tolerate risk and ambiguity than people who handle decisions by effortful reasoning. Why is 
this so? We argue that one plausible interpretation is that intuitive thinking is particularly 
adept at dealing with complex situations involving substantial uncertainty and many 
alternatives, as implied by Damasio et al. (1991) and Bechara et al. (1997). That intuitive 
thinking can be a powerful mode of achieving conclusions should not be surprising: many 
problems in mathematics find first an intuitive solution (a conjecture) and only later, through 
laborious reasoning, receive an analytic proof. Sometimes the time gap between conjecture 
and proof can be as long as a century, as with Poincaré’s conjectures. Sometimes even after 
centuries and many attempts by excellent mathematicians the proof is still elusive (e.g., 
Coldbach’s conjecture). The length of these gaps are a good measure of the power of intuitive 
thinking and suggest that intuition is particularly valuable when problems are analytically hard 
as those involving substantial ambiguity. This is consistent with our evidence from the Iowa 
card game and from market timing during the financial crisis showing that intuitive thinkers 
perform better when choices are made under substantial risk and ambiguity. 
Though attitudes towards risk and ambiguity have as common root the individual 
thinking mode, we also find that they differ in the way they are related to important observable 
variables, such as age, gender and, most importantly, wealth. While aversion to risk is 
negatively related to wealth we find that aversion to ambiguity is positively correlated with 
wealth. Correlation across these attitudes as well as their correlation with individual wealth 
can have important consequences for financial portfolio decisions and for the possibility of 
reconciling some of the puzzles in finance by allowing for more complex preference   30
representations. As pointed out by Bossaerts et. al (2006) a positive correlation between risk 
and ambiguity aversion can help explain the “value effect”. 
Furthermore, the positive correlation between ambiguity aversion and wealth that we 
document may, if confirmed, provide an explanation for the stockholding puzzle (the fact that 
many do not invest in stocks in spite of the large equity premium) at high wealth levels.
23 In 
addition, if the wealthy are increasingly ambiguity averse this may contribute to reconcile the 
historical level of the equity premium with the level predicted by the standard portfolio model 
(based on expected utility maximization) using reasonable values of risk aversion. Since 
ambiguity aversion commands an additional “ambiguity premium” on uncertain assets 
(Epstein and Schneider, 2010), the finding that many investors tend to be both risk and 
ambiguity averse implies that it may be possible to find reasonable parameter configurations 
of risk and ambiguity aversion that produce enough risk intolerance to account for the 
historical equity premium. 
 
 
                                                 
23 Gollier (2006) shows conditions under which aversion to ambiguity reinforces risk aversion in the sense that it 
induces investors to invest less in stocks – the risky and ambiguous asset. See also Hansen et al. (1999), Chen and 
Epstein (2002), Klibanoff et al. (2005), Mukerji et al. (2005), Gollier and Salanié (2006) and Epstein and 
Schneider (2010).   31
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Table 1. Sample statistics 
 
The table reports sample statistics for the variables used in the estimation based on the UCS survey. 
The sample size includes 1686 individuals. 
 
 
Variable  Mean  Standard 
deviation 
Minimum  Maximum 
 
Intuitive 0.15  0.35  0  1 
Deliberative 0.43  0.49  0  1 
Qualitative indicator of risk aversion   2.87  0.72    1  4 
Relative risk aversion  3.18  1.05  1  4 
Ambiguity averse  0.52  0.50  0  1 
Age 54.81  12.26  25  89 
Male 0.70  0.46  0  1 
Education (years)  12.73  4.25  0  21 
Married 0.68  0.46  0  1 
Resident in the North  0.51  0.50  0  1 
Resident in the Center  0.24  0.43  0  1 
Large city   0.01  0.12  0  1 
Financial literacy  4.63  1.15  1  8 
Financial ability   3.20  0.85  1  5 
Financial information  2.36  1.62  1  7 
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Table 2: Determinants of the qualitative indicator of risk aversion. 
 
The table shows ordered probit estimates of the probability that the investor is risk averse. The left hand 
side is a categorical variable taking values from 1 to 4, with higher values corresponding to a higher 
degree of risk aversion measured from self-reported preferences for risk and return combinations.  Only 
Intuitive is a dummy equal to 1 if the investor relies mostly on intuition when making decisions (zero 
otherwise); Deliberative is a dummy equal to 1 if he relies mostly on reasoning (zero otherwise). The 
excluded group is those who partly rely on intuition partly on reasoning. Standard errors are reported in 





Intuitive -0.063  -0.077  -0.099 
 (0.081)  (0.082)  (0.082) 
Deliberative 0.236**  0.213**  0.217** 
 (0.058)  (0.059)  (0.059) 
Age   0.004  0.006* 
   (0.002)  (0.002) 
Male   -0.324**  -0.308** 
   (0.061)  (0.061) 
Education   -0.041**  -0.035** 
   (0.007)  (0.007) 
Married   -0.045  -0.035 
   (0.060)  (0.060) 
North   -0.031  -0.016 
   (0.068)  (0.068) 
Centre   -0.029  -0.016 
   (0.077)  (0.078) 
City size    -0.330  -0.340 
   (0.234)  (0.234) 
Log Household Wealth      -0.099** 
     (0.028) 
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Table 3: Determinants of the indicator of relative risk aversion. 
 
The table shows ordered probit estimates of the probability that the investor is risk averse. The left hand 
side is a categorical variable taking values from 1 to 4, with higher values corresponding to a higher 
degree of relative risk aversion.  Intuitive is a dummy equal to 1 if the investor relies mostly on 
intuition when making decisions (zero otherwise); Deliberative is a dummy equal to 1 if he relies 
mostly on reasoning (zero otherwise). The excluded group is those who partly rely on intuition partly 





Intuitive -0.060  -0.077  -0.076 
 (0.083)  (0.084)  (0.084) 
Deliberative 0.203**  0.194**  0.197** 
 (0.061)  (0.062)  (0.062) 
Age   0.006*  0.006** 
   (0.002)  (0.002) 
Male   -0.305**  -0.310** 
   (0.064)  (0.064) 
Education   -0.029**  -0.026** 
   (0.007)  (0.007) 
Married   -0.036  -0.028 
   (0.063)  (0.063) 
North   0.120  0.129 
   (0.069)  (0.070) 
Centre   0.105  0.119 
   (0.080)  (0.080) 
City size    -0.158  -0.164 
   (0.235)  (0.235) 
Log Household Wealth      -0.036 
     (0.028) 
      






   38
Table 4. Determinants of ambiguity aversion. 
 
The table shows probit estimates of the probability that the investor is ambiguity averse.  Intuitive is a 
dummy equal to 1 if the investor relies mostly on intuition when making decisions (zero otherwise); 
Deliberative is a dummy equal to 1 if he relies mostly on reasoning (zero otherwise). The excluded 
group is those who partly rely on intuition partly on reasoning. Standard errors are reported in 





Intuitive -0.348**  -0.354**  -0.342** 
 (0.094)  (0.095)  (0.096) 
Deliberative 0.221**  0.233**  0.230** 
 (0.066)  (0.067)  (0.068) 
Age   -0.000  -0.003 
   (0.003)  (0.003) 
Male   0.122  0.104 
   (0.069)  (0.070) 
Education   0.016*  0.009 
   (0.008)  (0.008) 
Married   0.180**  0.161* 
   (0.069)  (0.069) 
North   0.104  0.091 
   (0.078)  (0.078) 
Centre   0.214*  0.201* 
   (0.089)  (0.090) 
City size    0.254  0.266 
   (0.274)  (0.274) 
Log Household Wealth      0.134** 
     (0.033) 
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Table 5. Sample statistics in the experimental data 
 
 
  Experiment 1  Experiment 2  Iowa Card 
Task 
Behavioral thinking mode (in seconds)     
Intuitive 17.17  40.48 28.59 
Partially deliberative  28.64  74.39  60.31 
Deliberative 75.24  177.19  180.02 
      
Self-reported thinking mode     
Mainly intuition (dummy)  0.06  0.05  0.05 
Both intuition and reasoning (dummy)  0.60  0.59  0.61 
Mainly reasoning (dummy)  0.34  0.35  0.35 
      
Risk aversion  4.98  6.17  6.11 
Ambiguity aversion (dummy)  0.26  0.43  0.50 
Ambiguity loving (dummy)  n.a.  0.17  0.36 
REI-Experiential engagement  3.23  3.05  3.06 
Male 0.49  0.47  0.51 
Age 22.76  24.97  24.62 
Math Score  7.76  7.47  7.58 
Family Income (in thousand euro)  70.32  44.47  49.33 
      
Number of observations  534  772  168 
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Table 6. Behavioral thinking mode and risk aversion 
 
Columns 1-2 present estimates using an ordered probit model using our measure of risk aversion in the 
first experiment as the dependent variable. This measure is increasing in risk aversion. Columns 3-4 
present estimates from an ordered probit model using our measure of risk aversion from the second 
experiment as the dependent variable. This measure is increasing in risk aversion. “Intuitive” is a 
dummy that takes the value of one if the average time it took an individual to decide on which color to 
bet on in the risky urn and in the ambiguous urn as described in the text is in the bottom 25
th percentile 
in the data. “Deliberative” is a dummy defined analogously but comprised of those whose decision 
times were above the 75
th percentile in the data. The excluded category includes those whose decision 
times were between the 25
th and the 75
th percentile and can therefore be thought of as partially 
deliberative. “Math Score” is each participant’s self-reported score on a standardized math exam given 
in the final year of high school in Italy. The score theoretically ranges from 0 to 10. “Experimental 
design controls” include dummies for the order in which the two versions of each risk and ambiguity 
elicitation methods were presented to subjects (in experiment 2 they were presented in the same order). 
The income measure is the participant’s family’s total annual net income from all sources, in thousands 
of euros. Robust standard errors, clustered at the session level in parentheses. 
 
  Experiment 1  Experiment 2 
   (1) 
 
(2) (3) (4) 
Intuitive -0.110**  -0.111***  -0.048**  -0.042 
 (0.029)  (0.032)  (0.023)  (0.052) 
Deliberative 0.163***  0.084**  0.283***  0.307*** 
 (0.023)  (0.033)  (0.049)  (0.065) 
Age   -0.003  -0.002 
   (0.024)  (0.005) 
Male   -0.046    0.032* 
   (0.063)  (0.019) 
Math  score   -0.006  -0.029 
   (0.026)  (0.034) 
30 ≤Income<  45   -0.194  -0.130 
   (0.337)  (0.115) 
45≤  Income<  70   0.078  0.019 
   (0.368)  (0.035) 
70 ≤ Income< 120    -0.184    -0.094** 
   (0.293)  (0.047) 
Income ≥  120   -0.425**   0.052 
   (0.186)  (0.119) 
Experiment design controls  Yes  Yes  n.a.  n.a. 
      
Observations  534 486 772 692 
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Table 7. Behavioral thinking mode and attitude toward ambiguity 
 
Columns 1 and 2 estimate a probit model with a dummy for ambiguity aversion in the first experiment 
as the dependent variable. Columns 3-6 use data from the second experiment and estimate probit 
models using dummies for ambiguity-aversion (col. 3-4) or ambiguity loving (col. 5-6) as the 
dependent variable. “Intuitive” is a dummy that takes the value of one if the average time it took an 
individual to decide on which color to bet on in the risky urn and in the ambiguous urn as described in 
the text is in the bottom 25
th percentile in the data. “Deliberative” is a dummy defined analogously but 
comprised of those whose decision times were above the 75
th percentile in the data. The excluded 
category includes those whose decision times were between the 25
th and the 75
th percentile and can 
therefore be thought of as partially deliberative. “Math Score” is each participant’s self-reported score 
on a standardized math exam given in the final year of high school in Italy. The score theoretically 
ranges from 0 to 10. The income measure is the participant’s family’s total annual net income from all 
sources, in thousands of euros. “Experimental design controls” include dummies for the order in which 
the two versions of each risk and ambiguity elicitation method were presented to subjects (in 
experiment 2 they were always presented in the same order).Robust standard errors, clustered at the 
session level in parentheses. 
 
  Experiment 1  Experiment 2 
  Ambiguity Aversion  Ambiguity Aversion  Ambiguity Loving 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
Intuitive -0.373**  -0.288*  -0.246***  -0.304***  0.433***  0.454*** 
  (0.152)  (0.153)  (0.057)  (0.040) (0.071) (0.059) 
Deliberative  0.147*  0.131 0.065 -0.036 -0.115* -0.108 
  (0.084)  (0.115)  (0.128)  (0.143) (0.062) (0.074) 
Age   -0.027***    -0.005**    -0.005 
   (0.008)    (0.002)    (0.005) 
Male   -0.072    0.237***    -0.031 
   (0.226)    (0.078)    (0.070) 
Math score    -0.021    -0.026    0.013 
   (0.042)    (0.026)    (0.049) 
30 ≤Inc< 45    0.155    -0.013    0.315 
   (0.135)    (0.165)    (0.223) 
45≤ Inc< 70    0.100    -0.222*    0.157*** 
   (0.136)    (0.126)    (0.056) 
70 ≤ Inc< 120    -0.016    -0.337***    0.079 
   (0.126)    (0.096)    (0.064) 
Income ≥  120   -0.176    -0.846   0.521*** 
   (0.172)    (0.534)    (0.054) 
Constant   0.351  -0.123***  -0.082  -1.039***  0.055 
    (0.301)  (0.029)  (0.073) (0.053) (0.068) 
Experiment 
design controls? 
Yes Yes  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
Observations  534  486  772  692 772 692   42
Table 8. Regressions for proportion of cards from “good decks” 
 
Each column presents OLS estimates. The dependent variable in each column is the proportion of cards in 
each 10-card block an individual drew from a “good deck,” i.e., one with a positive expected return. The 
independent variables include dummies for being Intuitive or Deliberative thinker. The measure we use is 
the behavioral decision time measure from each participant’s associated survey (Experiments 1 and 2). The 
excluded category is “partially deliberative.” Robust standard errors, clustered at the session level, are in 
parentheses. 
 












                   
Intuitive  0.08* 0.05 0.06  0.05  0.10**  0.08*  0.05  0.11***  0.12** 0.03 
  (0.04) (0.07)  (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.05)  (0.04) 
Deliberative -0.00 -0.01 0.03 -0.05 -0.02 0.02  0.03  -0.05  0.04  0.06* 
  (0.04) (0.04)  (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.04)  (0.03)  (0.03) 
Age  0.00 -0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 -0.00  0.00 
  (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.00) 
Male  0.00 0.08**  -0.03 -0.04 -0.02 -0.01  0.01  0.02  -0.07  -0.04 
  (0.03) (0.03)  (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)  (0.04)  (0.03)  (0.04)  (0.03) 
Math score  0.01  0.02**  -0.01  0.00  -0.01  0.00  0.01  -0.00  -0.01  -0.00 
  (0.01) (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)  (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.02)  (0.01) 
30 ≤Inc< 45  -0.01  0.01  0.02  -0.01  -0.03  0.07  0.02  0.06  0.09***  0.06 
  (0.03) (0.04)  (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04)  (0.06)  (0.05)  (0.03)  (0.05) 
45 ≤Inc<70 -0.09 -0.02  0.06 -0.03 0.01 0.04  0.02  0.05 0.08* 0.05 
  (0.06) (0.05)  (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04)  (0.08)  (0.06)  (0.04)  (0.04) 
70 ≤Inc<120 -0.03 0.11**  0.01  0.04  0.01  0.07*  -0.03  0.07  0.11**  0.11** 
  (0.05) (0.04)  (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04)  (0.05)  (0.05)  (0.04)  (0.04) 
Inc ≥ 120  -0.12  0.03  0.01  -0.01  -0.04  -0.08**  -0.02  -0.11  -0.09**  0.01 
  (0.12) (0.06)  (0.08) (0.06) (0.06) (0.03)  (0.12)  (0.10)  (0.04)  (0.15) 
Constant  0.44*** 0.30** 0.51** 0.51*** 0.62** 0.59*** 0.56*** 0.59***  0.68**  0.56*** 
  (0.13) (0.12)  (0.19) (0.11) (0.24) (0.17)  (0.12)  (0.18)  (0.24)  (0.16) 
                 
Observations  143 143  143 143 143 143  143  143  143  143 
R-squared  0.05 0.10  0.03 0.07 0.04 0.10  0.04  0.07  0.10  0.05 
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Table 9. Intuitive thinking and market timing  
 
The table shows estimates of the linear probability that the investor sells stocks in month t. Before is a dummy=1 
if t precedes the collapse of Lehman Brothers; Intuitive is a dummy equal to 1 if the investor relies mostly on 
intuition when making decisions (zero otherwise). Education is years of completed education; Financial literacy 
is an index of financial literacy based on answers to a set of quizzes posed to UVCS respondents; Financial 
ability is a self-reported index of ability to make financial decisions (see Guiso and Jappelli, 2010 for a 
description of the last two indicators); Financial information is a measure of the time investors spend collecting 




(2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Before  *intuitive  0.014** 0.017** 0.017** 0.017** 0.027** 0.026** 
  (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) 
(1-Before)  *intuitive  0.002 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.012 0.011 
  (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) 
Before  0.057**  0.018 0.021 0.025 0.022 0.032 
  (0.002) (0.035) (0.035) (0.036) (0.042) (0.040) 
(1-Before)  0.039** 0.002 -0.014 -0.005 -0.003 0.014 
  (0.003) (0.035) (0.036) (0.037) (0.042) (0.040) 
Male   -0.010**  -0.009**  -0.010** -0.014** -0.013** 
    (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
Age    0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 
    (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Log  net  wealth  2007    0.001 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.001 
    (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Before    *education     -0.002**     
     (0.000)     
(1-Before)  *  education     -0.002**     
     (0.000)     
Before    *financial  literacy      -0.002    
      (0.002)    
(1-Before)  *financial  literacy        0.001    
      (0.002)    
Before * financial ability          0.002   
       (0.003)   
(1-Before) * financial ability           0.005   
       (0.003)   
Before * financial 
information  
      - 0 . 0 0 2  
        (0.001) 
(1-Before) * financial 
information 
      - 0 . 0 0 2  
        (0.002) 
R-squared  0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.06 
Observations  21315 20405 20405 20405 14875 14875 
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Figure 1 
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A.1. The survey data 
 
The survey data used draw on a sample of Italian retail investors of the Unicredit Group. The 
Unicredit Clients’ Survey (UCS) was conducted between June and September 2007 and 
elicited detailed financial and demographic information on a sample of 1686 individuals with 
a checking account in one of the banks of the Unicredit Group. The eligible population of 
customers excludes customers under 20 and over 80, and customers with assets of less than 
10,000 Euros with Unicredit. The sampled population size is around 1.3 million customers. 
The survey was aimed at acquiring information on the behavior and expectations of Unicredit 
Group customers and focused on multi-banking, attitude towards saving and investing, 
financial literacy and propensity for risk, pensions and need for insurance. The sample is 
stratified according to three criteria: geographical area, city size, financial wealth, and it 
explicitly over-samples rich clients. In particular, only clients with at least €10,000 of 
financial wealth at Unicredit at the end of 2006 are included in the sample. 
 
An important feature of the survey is that the sample selection is based on Unicredit 
individual retail investors. The survey, however, contains also detailed information on the 
spouse, if present. Financial variables are elicited for both respondents and households. In the 
paper, demographic variables refer to the household head (even if different from the 
respondent), and economic variables (real and financial assets) to the household, not to the 
individual investor. The survey contains detailed information on ownership of real and 
financial assets, and amounts invested. For real assets, UCS reports separate data on primary 
residence, investment real estate, land, business wealth, and debt (distinguished between 
mortgage and other debt). Real asset amounts are elicited without use of bracketing. 
 
The sampling scheme is similar to that of the Bank of Italy Survey of Household Income and 
Wealth (SHIW). The population is stratified along two criteria: geographical area of residence 
(North-East, North-West, Central and Southern Italy) and wealth held with Unicredit as of 
June 30 2006. The sample size is 1,686 customers, of whom 1,580 are from Unicredit Retail 
Bank, and 106 from Unicredit Private Bank (the upper tier customer bank). The survey was 
administered between May 1 and September 30 of 2007 by a leading Italian polling agency, 
which also conducts the SHIW for the Bank of Italy. Most interviewers had substantial 
experience of administering the SHIW, which is likely to increase the quality of the data. The 
UCS was piloted in the first quarter of 2007, and the Computer Assisted Personal Interview 
methodology was employed for all interviews. To overcome some of the problems arising 
from non-responses, the sample was balanced ex-post with respect to the true distribution of 
assets, area of residence, city size, gender, age and education of the eligible population. 
 
The questionnaire has 9 sections. Sections A and B refer, respectively, to respondent and 
household demographic and occupation variables. Section C focuses on saving, investment 
and financial risk. Section D asks detailed questions about financial wealth and portfolio 
allocation, and Section E enquires about consumer debt and mortgages. By design, Sections 
A, B, D and E allow a perfect matching with the SHIW questionnaire. Questions on real estate   46
and entrepreneurial activities are included in Section F. Section G contains questions on 
subjective expectations, and section H focuses on insurance and private pension funds. The 
last two sections ask about income and expectations and need for insurance and pension 
products. As shown in Table A1, compared with the Italian population, as surveyed by the 
2006 Bank of Italy SHIW, Unicredit Group customers are older, more educated, less likely to 
work in the manufacturing sector, and more likely to live in the North. 
 
Table A1: UCS – SHIW comparison 
 UCS  SHIW 
Highest income earner 
SHIW 
Bank account holder 
Gender      
Male 0.69  0.69  0.71 
Female 0.31  0.31  0.29 
Age      
up to 30  0.04  0.06  0.06 
31 to 40  0.18  0.19  0.20 
41 to 50  0.22  0.22  0.22 
51 to 65  0.36  0.24  0.24 
over 65  0.20  0.29  0.27 
Education      
elementary school  0.10  0.27  0.22 
middle school  0.29  0.36  0.37 
high school  0.41  0.27  0.30 
university degree  0.20  0.10  0.10 
Sector of activity      
Agriculture 0.03  0.03 0.03 
Industry 0.13  0.21  0.23 
Public Administration  0.19  0.15  0.17 
other sector  0.30  0.19  0.20 
not employed  0.35  0.40  0.37 
Household size      
1 member  0.21  0.25  0.23 
2 members  0.29  0.28  0.29 
3 members  0.26  0.21  0.22 
4 members  0.20  0.18  0.19 
5 or more members  0.04  0.07  0.06 
Geographical area      
Northern Italy  0.73  0.48  0.52 
Central Italy  0.14  0.20  0.21 
South and Islands  0.13  0.32  0.27 
Note: The table compares sample means of selected demographic variables in the UCS and 2006 
SHIW. Means are computed using sample weights.   47
A2. Experimental design 
 
A.2.1. Experiment 1 
 
Participants in the experiment were recruited from among students attending one of two 
universities Rome, Italy. The first—LUISS Guido Carli—is a small private university, while 
the second, La Sapienza, is the largest public university in Rome with an enrollment of over 
100,000 students. Thus, the student population from which we recruit is potentially quite 
heterogeneous. Invitations to take part in our experiment were sent out via e-mailto a large list 
of potential experimental participants at both universities. The experiment itself was 
conducted completely on-line to preserve anonymity and reduce experimenter demand effect.  
Ten percent of participants were randomly chosen by the computer to be paid their potential 
earnings from the experiment. 
 
The experiment consisted of several sections, one of which was remunerated, in the following 
order: (i) 20 questions from the Rational Experiential Inventory (Pacini and Epstein, 1999); 
(ii) a non-remunerated section on attitudes towards risk, social risk and ambiguity; iii) a 
remunerated section eliciting risk and ambiguity preferences (detailed below); iv) the final 20 
questions from the REI; v) a section collecting participants’ demographic characteristics. 
 
When participants reached the remunerated risk and ambiguity section, before seeing any of 
the constituent questions, they were told that this section—and only this section—would 
count toward their potential experimental earnings. Specifically, they were informed that one 
question in the section had already been chosen randomly by the computer to determine their 
potential experimental earnings so that their decisions could not in any way influence the 
question chosen. They were told, furthermore, that 10 percent of participants who completed 
the experiment would be chosen randomly by the computer to be actually paid their potential 
earnings from the experiment. Potential earnings from the remunerated section of the 
experiment theoretically ranged from €1 to €38.50 depending on participants’ choices and the 
resolution of uncertainty, so that both potential and actual stakes were reasonably large 
compared to participants’ opportunity costs of participating—i.e., about 20 minutes of their 
time in total. 
 
In the remunerated section, risk aversion was measured using a procedure due to Holt and 
Laury (2002) involving two binary lotteries: lottery A and lottery B. Lottery A features a high 
maximum payoff (38.50 euros) but a low minimum payoff (0.10 euros), while lottery B 
features a lower maximum payoff but a higher minimum payoff (28.50 euros, and 16.00 
euros, respectively). The high payoff in both lotteries occurs with (common) probability, p, 
while the low payoff occurs with probability (1-p). To obtain a measure of risk aversion, each 
participant makes a sequence of 10 choices between lotteries A and B where p is increased 
from 0.1 to 1 in steps of 0.1. The value of p at which a participant switches from the less risky 
lottery B to the riskier lottery A is our measure of risk aversion: more risk averse agents 
should switch later in the sequence. 
 
To measure ambiguity aversion we used a two-phase procedure following Halevy (2007).  In 
the first phase of this procedure, two urns are described to participants: one (risky) urn 
contains 5 red balls and 5 white balls, while the other (ambiguous) urn contains 10 red and 
white balls. Participants are informed that the computer will choose one ball at random from   48
each of the two urns, and asked sequentially to guess which color ball will be drawn from 
each of the two urns. Each correct guess pays €20, while incorrect guesses pay €0. In the 
second phase of the procedure participants state the minimum amount of money they would 
accept to give up the right to the earnings from each of the two bets, separately, and are given 
incentives to report these values truthfully.
24 We use the difference in participants’ valuations 
for the two urns as an indicator of ambiguity aversion: those who value the ambiguous urn 
strictly less are labeled ambiguity averse. 
 
Each participant completed two slightly different versions of both the risk preferences and the 
ambiguity preferences elicitation mechanisms. The only difference between the versions 
relates to un-chosen options. In one version participants were told they would know outcomes 
of un-chosen options, while in another version participants were told they would only learn 
outcomes directly relevant to their earnings.
25 These two versions were conducted because in 
some models of decision-making under uncertainty this distinction is important, (see, e.g., 
Loomes and Sugden, 1986), and existing experiments vary in which version is used.
26 There 
were no significant differences in our measures between versions.
27 Therefore, to reduce the 
possible impact of participants’ mistakes on our risk and ambiguity aversion measures we 
incorporate responses from both versions of the risk and ambiguity elicitation mechanisms: 
for our risk aversion measure, we average across the two versions for each respondent; with 
respect to ambiguity aversion, we label individuals as ambiguity averse only if they are 
classified this way by both versions of the ambiguity preferences elicitation mechanism. 
 
To address concerns about order effects, we asked the questions in the remunerated section in 
four different orders: one of the two versions of our risk preferences elicitation procedure 
always came first, followed by two ambiguity preferences elicitation mechanisms—one of 
each version—followed by, finally, the remaining version of our risk preferences elicitation 
procedure. Ideally, we would have liked to have implemented all possible orders of the 
questions comprising our risk and ambiguity preferences elicitations mechanisms in order to 
fully address concerns of order effects. While this was not feasible due to the large number of 
                                                 
24 For each of the two urn-guesses, separately, the procedure is as follows: the computer draws a 
number between 0 and 20 which can be thought of as a “price.” If this price is higher than the 
participant’s stated minimum willingness-to-accept, the participant receives a payment equal (in euros) 
to the price but gives up his or her right to the earnings from the urn-guess. Otherwise the participant 
retains the right to the earnings from his or her urn-guess. It is well-known that this mechanism 
provides incentives for participants to truthfully state their values for each of the bets irrespective of 
risk preferences. Since the main concern with this mechanism is that it is relatively complicated, each 
participant had to pass a short quiz about the procedure immediately before stating their minimum-
willingness-to-accept values.  
25 For example, in our risk-preferences elicitation mechanism described above, the difference was 
whether subjects would find out the outcome of lottery A if they chose lottery B, and vice versa.  
26 For example, often to placate incredulous participants, experiments are designed to resolve 
uncertainty using a physical and familiar mechanism, (e.g., flipping a coin). In such a design 
participants will automatically know the outcomes of all lotteries depending on the coin flip, both 
chosen and un-chosen. In principle this could be avoided by flipping a separate coin for each outcome 
depending on uncertainty, independently. This is what we try to mimic here. However, for logistical 
reasons this is typically not done in experiments using physical randomizing devices. 
27 Neither Wilcoxon signed-rank tests of equality of distributions, nor simple t-tests for differences in 
means indicated any statistically significant differences.    49
possible question orders, the four orders we implemented should go a long way toward 
ameliorating order concerns. 
 
The experiment was conducted in four separate sessions, each session being characterized by 
the range of dates over which it was conducted, by the population of participants invited, and 
by variation in design elements such as question order. Session 1 was conducted from 
November 30 to December 4, 2009. The second session was conducted the following week: 
from December 7 to December 11. Session 3 occurred about a month later, after the holidays, 
from January 13 to January 19. The final session was conducted a couple of weeks later, from 
January 30 to Feb 1, 2010.  The first two sessions were conducted in English and only 
English-speaking LUISS students were invited to participate. The latter two sessions were 
conducted in Italian and both LUISS and La Sapienza students were invited to participate.  
 
A.2.2. Experiment 2 
 
Our second experiment was conducted on-line, in several sessions, from May to October 
2010. Students of La Sapienza University in Rome, Italy were invited to participate from a 
pre-existing list of potential participants. In total 772 students participated. Ten percent of 
participants were randomly chosen by the computer to be paid their potential earnings from 
the experiment. 
 
The design of the experiment was identical to that of Experiment 1, with the exception of 
the risk and ambiguity aversion measures in the remunerated section. To measure risk 
aversion, we again used a Holt and Laury procedure. However, this time, participants were 
simply asked to specify the minimum value of p, the probability of the high-paying 
outcome, for which they would switch from preferring the low variance outcome (20 euros 
vs. 16 euros) to the higher variance outcome (38.50 euros vs. 1 euro). This is common 
implementation of the Holt and Laury procedure which has the advantage of being simple to 
implement. 
 
To measure ambiguity aversion, instead of the more complicated Halevy procedure, we used 
a more direct method. This method consisted of two questions. In the first question, two urns 
were described to participants exactly as in Experiment 1: one non-ambiguous (Urn 1, 
containing 5 red balls and 5 white balls) and one ambiguous (Urn 2, containing: 10 red or 
white balls). It was then explained that one ball would be drawn from one of the two urns 
and if that ball is red the participant will win €20 and €0 otherwise. Participants had to 
decide which urn they wanted the ball drawn from. Their options were: Urn 1, Urn 2 or “no 
preference.” It was made known to the participants that if they chose “no preference” then 
the computer would select between the two urns randomly, with equal probability, and €0.10 
would be added to the earnings from the resulting earnings. This feature ensures that urn 
preferences are strict. In the second question, participants were asked to consider exactly the 
same two urns and the same lottery, except with the winning ball being white. They faced 
the same choice set as before. They stated whether they preferred the ball to be extracted 
from Urn 1, Urn 2, or that they had no preference. Choosing the non-ambiguous urn both 
times implies the decision maker is ambiguity averse, since there is no single belief about 
the proportion of red and white balls in the ambiguous urn which would make it strictly 
preferable in both draws. Using the same reasoning, choosing the ambiguous urn both times 
implies the decision maker prefers ambiguity.   50
 
A.2.2. Questions used for our main thinking mode measure in the experiments 
 
In each experiment, we used participants’ average response time to two questions used in 
our ambiguity preferences elicitations procedures to construct our three-category behavioral 
thinking mode measure.  Because we elicited ambiguity preferences in different ways in the 
two experiments, the precise questions used varied by experiment. 
 
In Experiment 1, the first question we used asked participants to predict which color ball 
would be drawn from an (ambiguous Ellsberg) urn containing 10 red and white balls in 
unknown proportions.  The second question asked participants to predict the color ball that 
would be drawn from an urn containing five red and five white balls.  Each of these two 
questions paid participants €20 for a correct prediction while incorrect guesses paid zero.  
We used the average response time to both of these two questions to construct our main 
thinking mode measure for Experiment 1 participants. 
 
In Experiment 2 our ambiguity preferences elicitation procedure was simpler and involved 
exactly two questions: i) a choice between either a risky or ambiguous urn from which the 
draw of a red ball paid €20; ii) a choice between either a risky or ambiguous urn from which 
the draw of a white ball paid €20.  We used the average response time to both of these two 




A.2.3. The Iowa Card Task Experiment 
 
We invited a random subset of the pool of students who participated in Experiment 1 or 
Experiment 2 to come to participate in a laboratory experiment conducted at the Einaudi 
Institute for Economics and Finance in Rome, Italy. In total, 168 students participated in our 
Iowa Card Task Experiment.  
 
Participants were seated at individual computer workstations and separated by opaque 
dividers. Each participant was endowed with 2000 points, and it was explained that points 
were converted into euro at the rate of 200:1. Each participant was then instructed that they 
would be making a series of draws from (computerized) card decks and that they must keep 
drawing cards as long as this was an option. They were instructed they should try to make as 
much money as possible. After these instructions, four card decks appeared on each 
participant’s computer screen, in a single row. Each card deck appeared identical. Clicking 
on a deck turned a card over, revealing a win and a loss, typically implying a net gain in 
points but sometimes a net loss. 
 
The decks were pre-programmed so that two were “good” decks which had a positive return 
of 250 points every 10 draws; two were “bad” decks pre-programmed to yield a negative 
return of 100 points every 10 draws. The exact sequence of gains and losses for each deck 
was pre-programmed to be identical to the original Iowa Card Task experiment, so that each 
participant faced the exact same card decks. The order in which the card decks appeared on-
screen was, however, randomized. This eliminates the possibility that, for instance, it was   51
just easier to click on the left-most card deck which just happened to be a “good” deck so 
that variation in effort would explain a pattern where good decks were selected more 
frequently. 
 
After a participant had made 100 draws, he or she was informed that the experiment was 
over and to sit quietly while other participants finished. When all participants had finished, 
each participant was paid the money he or she had earned from the card task. Because losses 
were possible on two of the decks, some participants made significantly less than their 
endowment. No participant, however, ended up earning zero or a negative amount.  
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Table A2. Time to complete first REI section 
 
The dependent variable is the number of seconds a participant took to complete the first half of the REI, 
which was administered early in the experiment and before any risk- or ambiguity-related questions were 
asked. “Intuitive” is a dummy that takes the value of one if the average time it took an individual to decide 
on which color to bet on from the risky urn and from the ambiguous urn in the urn-valuation task was in 
the bottom 25
th percentile in the data. “Deliberative” is a dummy defined analogously but encompassing 
those whose decision times were in the 75
th percentile or above. The excluded category contains those 
whose decision times were between the 25
th and the 75
th percentile, who can be thought of as partially 
deliberative. “Math Score” is each participant’s self-reported score on a standardized math exam given in 
the final year of high school in Italy. The score theoretically ranges from 0 to 10. “Experimental Design 
Controls” include dummies for the order in which the two versions of each risk and ambiguity elicitation 
methods were presented to subjects. The income measure is the participant’s family’s total annual net 
income from all sources, in thousands of euros. “Experimental design controls” include dummies for the 
order in which the two versions of each risk and ambiguity elicitation methods were presented to subjects 
(in experiment 2 they were presented in the same order).Robust standard errors, clustered at the session 
level in parentheses. 
 
  Experiment 1  Experiment 2 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Intuitive -48.235**  -50.882**  -36.056  -47.419 
 (13.259)  (12.884)  (26.346)  (36.512) 
Deliberative 88.489***  81.828**  68.336**  44.856*** 
 (13.761)  (20.684)  (13.468)  (0.793) 
Age   1.661    -0.066 
   (1.376)  (1.866) 
Male   -3.383    -12.209 
   (7.786)    (15.469) 
Math score    -4.085***    1.679 
   (0.507)    (14.221) 
30 ≤ Inc< 45    -2.027    -40.828* 
   (12.745)    (13.416) 
45 ≤ Inc<70    -3.586    -23.463 
   (6.620)    (39.632) 
70 ≤ Inc< 120    4.567    0.079 
   (9.797)  (6.821) 
Income ≥ 120    -12.300    -2.859 
   (10.425)    (34.134) 
Constant  180.048*** 173.666** 251.768*** 263.550** 
  (8.479) (43.335) (8.461) (80.565) 
        
R-squared 0.212  0.226  0.014  0.015 
Experimental Design Controls  Yes  Yes  n.a  n.a. 
Observations  534 486 772 692 
 